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The imposition of capital punishment is fast becoming a
controversial issue in the United States, due to the news of the
high number of innocents being released from prison and from
death row. This news is even forcing proponents of capital
punishment who have always advocated the idea of an ultimate
sanction for the most heinous crimes to question their strong
support for such an irreversible sanction. Specifically, recent
advances in DNA testing leading to the release of innocent de-
J.D. candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2002. The author would
like to thank Professors Christopher Bracey and Lawrence Marshall for their invalu-
able research and editorial assistance.
See generally MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL, IN SPrrIE OF INNOCENcE ERRO,\EOUS
CONVICIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1992); BARRY SCHEcK Er AL, AcruAL INNoctNcr. FivE
DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONICTED (2000)
(both discussing cases where prisoners whose innocence was later established were
released from prison and from death row). In the twenty-five year period since the
U.S. Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in 1974, 553 people have been exe-
cuted. Id. at 218. Within that period, eighty convicted prisoners have been released
from death row, and ultimately had their convictions vacated altogether. Id. For
every seven prisoners executed, one innocent person is freed. Id Between 1973 and
1993, an average of 2.5 people a year were released from death row. Ia From 1993
to 1999, an average of 4.6 convicted people were set free annually. Id.
Republican Governor George Ryan of Illinois, a longtime advocate of capital
punishment, issued a moratorium against the death penalty, temporarily halting exe-
cutions in his state in order to ensure that inmates were not being put to death for
crimes they did not commit. Toni Locy, Push to Reform Death Penaly Grouing Advo-
cates: Mistakes Could Shake Confidence in System, USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 2001, at 5A. In
many instances, other longtime supporters of capital punishment are also leading the
push for death penalty safeguards. Id.
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fendants from death row have brought capital punishment to
the forefront of recent debate.3 In these cases, the principal
evidence offered by the prosecution linking the defendants to
the crimes was the testimony of one or more eyewitnesses who
either identified the defendant in a lineup or from a photo
spread.4 The subsequent DNA testing clearly demonstrated that
the eyewitnesses were wrong and firmly established that such
testimony is extremely fallible.5
Eyewitness error remains a substantial cause of wrongful
convictions.5 With the fallibility of eyewitness testimony being
so high, capital cases that rely on such testimony as evidence
should require a quantitative evidentiary standard to be met in
' By the year 2000, at least sixty-two DNA exonerations took place in twenty-two
states. SCHECK ETAL., supra note 1, at 262. In the past twelve years alone, eighty-two
convicts have been exonerated by DNA testing. Locy, supra note 2, at 5A. Death row
inmates have also been exonerated because of subsequent confessions by the real
perpetrators; the discovery of new, exculpatory evidence; and the showing of perjured
or otherwise faulty eyewitness testimony. Cases of Innocence: 1973-Present, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innoccases.html (last modifiedJan. 9, 2001).
For the purposes of this Article, an eyewitness is "one who personally observes an
event." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 608 (7th ed. 1999). An eyewitness identification is
the "naming or description by which one who has seen an event testifies from mem-
ory about the person or persons involved." Id. According to The Innocence Project
at Cardozo Law School, of the seventy-seven men whose convictions were overturned
after DNA testing proved their innocence, sixty-five had been found guilty because of
faulty eyewitness statements. Robyn Blumner, Eyewitness Accounts Often Prove Unreli-
able, CHICAGO SuN-TImEs, Jan. 2, 2001, at 21. Of the about 2,000,000 people incarcer-
ated in the United States in 2001, it is estimated that 8,000-10,000 of them were
wrongly convicted on the basis of eyewitness testimony. Id.
For examples of cases where eyewitness testimony was incorrect, see generally
People v. Cobb, 455 N.E.2d 31 (111. 1983); Bloodsworth v. State, 543 A.2d 382 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (discussed infra p. 769); People v. Williams, 588 N.E.2d 983 (Il.
1991) (discussed infra p. 770); and Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1976) (dis-
cussed infra p. 771).
See supra note 4.
6 SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at xvi; see also RADELET, supra note 1, at 18 (stating
that the two most frequent causes of erroneous convictions are perjury by prosecu-
tion witnesses and mistaken eyewitness testimony); Gary L. Wells et a]., Eyewitness Iden-
tification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HuM.
BEHAv. 605 (1998) (stating that cases of proven wrongful convictions of innocent
people have consistently shown that mistaken eyewitness identification is responsible
for more of these wrongful convictions than all other causes combined). For the
purposes of this Article, "wrongful" convictions are those that were secured with per-
jured or erroneous eyewitness testimony, and were subsequently overturned because
of new, exculpatory evidence proving the defendants' innocence. The wrongful con-
victions discussed in this paper do not include those obtained through plea-
bargaining.
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order for such evidence to be even allowed at trial. If the prose-
cution wishes to offer eyewitness testimony as evidence in a capi-
tal case, a constitutionally 7 based federal corroboration
requirement must be instated. This Comment proposes that
the Supreme Court, when reviewing its next capital case where
eyewitness testimony is offered as evidence, should hold that un-
less the testimony is corroborated in some way, the defendant's
conviction, if based largely on such testimony, must be over-
turned and declared a violation of the defendant's Eighth
Amendment rights.8 This ruling does not suggest that a prose-
7 For the purposes of this Article, "capital" cases are those in which a death sen-
tence may be imposed. Also, rather than having each state create its own rule regard-
ing evidentiary requirements in capital cases, imposing a federal requirement would
be preferred because it would ensure uniformity among the states. The Supreme
Court should rule that because eyewitness testimony is so fallible, a heightened ei-
dentiary standard is required when presenting eyewitness testimony in a capital case.
The Court should further rule that if such a standard is not met, the criminal defen-
dant's Eighth Amendment right to not have "cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted" upon him would be violated. U.S. CONST. amend. VIIL Naturally, the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause would be fully applicable to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV; see also
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (applying the Eighth Amendment
ban against cruel and unusual punishment to a California statute %ia the Fourteenth
Amendment).
After such a ruling, a defendant's lawyer, when appealing the imposition of the
death penalty on his client, would argue that because the prosecutor had offered un-
corroborated testimony of a single eyewitness as evidence against the defendant, the
imposition of a death sentence constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" and
thereby violated the defendant's Eighth Amendment rights. The defendant's la,,yer
would then cite the Supreme Court decision (advocated in this Article) mandating
that some form of corroboration be offered with the single eyewitness testimony, and
would argue that the Supreme Court's decision is binding on the state through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
8 See supra note 7 for the constitutional analysis. As is explained in further detail
in Part H of this Comment, corroboration means presenting more than one witness
who can testify to the same overt act, or presenting DNA evidence, fingerprint and
footprint evidence, or a video or audiotape that can corroborate the eyeitness's tes-
timony. The evidentiary requirement, then, would read as follow: if a prosecutor is
going to present eyewitness testimony as evidence in a capital case, the prosecutor
must also offer some type of corroborating evidence to support the eyewitness testi-
mony, because such testimony, in general, is so fallible.
Of course, one could ask why a corroboration requirement should only be instated
in capital cases and not in noncapital cases where a sentence of imprisonment is im-
posed. Surely an innocent defendant's due process rights are no less violated where a
sentence of imprisonment is imposed over a sentence of death. Justice Brennan, in
his concurrence in Furman v. Georgia, best explains why sentencing in capital and
noncapital cases should be afforded differing treatment:
20011
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cutor could not try a defendant at all if there were no eyewit-
nesses to the crime. The ruling merely requires that if a prose-
cutor plans on using eyewitness testimony, he must provide
some form of corroboration for the testimony because of the
high likelihood of its fallibility. If no such corroboration is
available, the prosecutor can get around the quantitative re-
quirement by not presenting eyewitness testimony at all, or by
seeking life imprisonment rather than capital punishment.9
The requirement of corroboration as a prerequisite to ob-
taining a conviction in a capital case is not foreign to our crimi-
nal system. The law of treason has a corroboration requirement
Death is truly an awesome punishment. The calculated killing of a human being by the
State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity. The contrast
with the plight of a person punished by imprisonment is evident. An individual in prison
does not lose "the right to have rights." A prisoner retains.., the constitutional rights to
the free exercise of religion, to be free of cruel and unusual punishments, and to treat-
ment as a "person" for purposes of due process of law .... A prisoner ... retains the right
of access to the courts. His punishment is not irrevocable .... (Tihe finality of death pre-
cludes relief. An executed person has indeed "lost the right to have rights."
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). As Justice
Brennan so aptly explains, imprisonment, unlike execution, does not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment because the prisoner is still alive and thereby still retains the
right to at least have and exercise constitutional rights. IM.
See supra note 8 for an explanation as to why the imprisonment of an innocent
defendant does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment and therefore should
not receive the same treatment as a sentence of execution.
Of course, one could argue that with the advent of more accurate DNA testing, a
proposal for eyewitness corroboration is no longer needed and that perhaps prosecu-
tors should just shy away from presenting eyewitness evidence altogether. The prob-
lem with such an argument, however, is that only a fraction of serious crimes leave
behind definitive biological evidence that lends itself to DNA testing. Videotape:
Wrongful Convictions: Causes and Remedies (Gary WellsJan. 2001). In other words,
in cases where no biological evidence is found, eyewitness identification will still be
needed as primary evidence against the defendant. Id. Therefore, notwithstanding
recent advances in DNA technology, the fallibility of eyewitness testimony still needs
to be addressed.
Other suggestions have been made concerning ways to improve the reliability of
eyewitness testimony. For instance, Gary Wells suggests using a sequential lineup
procedure, or encouraging blind testing. I& In a sequential lineup, the witness
would get to see one suspect at a time, rather than a few at a time. Id. Wells suggests
that such a procedure would prevent the witness from making relative judgments, i.e.
from selecting the person who looks most like the perpetrator relative to the other
members of the lineup. Id- Blind testing would force the tester to have no knowledge
concerning the desired result of the lineup, and therefore to have no influence over
the witness's identification. ML Note that these suggested procedures look to im-
prove the quality of an eyewitness's testimony. This Comment is proposing more of a
quantitative approach to eyewitness testimony.
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that is explicitly stated in the Constitution.'" The requirement is
more commonly known as the two-witness rule and its main
purpose is to protect those who are innocent of treason and to
promote reliability." The rule mandates that a person may not
be convicted of treason unless at least two witnesses testify to the
same overt act.
1 2
This Comment uses the two-witness rule of treason as a
model and justification for adopting a constitutional corrobora-
tion requirement in all state and federal capital cases. Part I
discusses the inaccuracies of eyewitness testimony and describes
in detail cases where such testimony wrongfully placed an inno-
cent man on death row. Part II examines the three federal
crimes that currently carry the possibility of a death sentence
and discusses how none of these statutes list any type of quanti-
tative evidentiary requirement that must be met before a capital
sentence can be imposed.13 Part I analyzes the two-witness rule
of treason and its overt act requirement. In addition, Part M
discusses the rule's applicability to cases involving murder."1 Fi-
10 Article m, Section 3 of the Constitution states, "Treason against the United
States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies,
giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. Canada has a similar codified evidentiary requirement for
treason, which states, "No person shall be convicted of treason upon the evidence of
only one witness, unless the evidence of that witness is corroborated in a material par-
ticular by evidence that implicates the accused." R.S.C. C-34 §47 (2) (1970).
" In his treatise on Evidence, Wigmore states, "the very object of the [two-witnessi
rule is to protect those who are innocent of treason .... " 7 W,,IGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2038 (1978). See also Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship between the Prvilege
Against Compulsoy Seif-Inaimination and the Involuntay Confession Rule (Part I), 53 OHIo
Sr. LJ. 101, 115 (1992) (stating "the two-witness rule was intended to advance an in-
terest in reliability").
Of course, one could argue that if eyewitness testimony in general is unreliable,
then merely increasing the number of eyewitnesses testifying would do little to en-
hance reliability. This Comment suggests that at the very least, requiring two eycwit-
nesses could mitigate (not eliminate) the possibility of a wrongful conviction.
Furthermore, this Comment proposes a rule that would allow other corroborating
evidence (such as that of DNA, etc.), and not just that of another eyewitness, to sup-
port an eyewitness's testimony.
"
2 The justification of this rule and the definition of what constitutes an overt act is
discussed infra pp. 775-82.
IS The three crimes are espionage, first-degree murder, and treason. &e generally
18 U.S.C. §§ 794, 1111, 2381 (2000).
4 Even though this Comment is proposing that the tvo-witness rule apply to all
capital cases, it will focus only on the rule's applicability to first-degree murder cases
2001]
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nally, Part IV explains the justification for applying treason's
two-witness rule to murder, and draws analogies between the
two crimes.
I. THE FALLIBILITY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
A study of 84% of DNA exonerations revealed that mistaken
eyewitness identification was the primary evidence used to con-
vict the actually innocent defendants." This study was by no
means the first one of its kind. In 1932, Edwin Borchard, a law
professor at Yale University, published a collection of sixty-five
cases where an innocent person was convicted for a crime he
did not commit.1 In his book, Borchard cited eyewitness error
as the "major source of these tragic errors.' 7 In fact, eyewitness
because the commission of that crime is more prevalent today than the commission
of either treason or espionage.
" For the purposes of this Comment, "mistaken identification" is that which is
simply incorrect because of the eyewitness's faulty memory, for example, or is erro-
neous due to perjured testimony. The study of DNA exonerations was conducted by
The Innocence Project. The Project, founded by Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld, is
a group that uses DNA testing to help overturn convictions. See supra note 4; SCHECK
ETAL., supra note 1, at 73; see also Wrongful Convictions: Causes and Remedies, supra
note 9.
Eyewitness testimony is described here as "primary evidence" because of the de-
finitive impression it leaves on ajury. Id. Gary Wells describes eyewitness testimony
as "direct evidence" of the defendant's identity. Id. He explains that if ajury believes
the eyewitness who points to the defendant in court and emphatically states, "I saw
him do it," the jury is basically believing that the defendant is guilty of the crime. Id.
Wells further explains that eyewitness testimony, unlike fingerprint evidence, for ex-
ample, directly shows that the defendant committed the crime. Id. Fingerprint evi-
dence would only prove that someone was at the crime scene, not that they
committed the crime itself. Id.
" EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINALJUSTICE vii
(1961). Even though Borchard's study was conducted as long ago as 1932, it is dis-
cussed here to show that wrongful convictions are not merely a recent problem, but
have been prevalent since the 1800s. Borchard's chief concern was not in preventing
these innocent men from being convicted in the first place, but was in ensuring that
some restitution be given them for their "loss and damage suffered." Id. Borchard
selected cases from a cross-section of states, and, in each case, the convicted person's
innocence was established either by a subsequent conviction of the real perpetrator,
or by the discovery of new evidence. Id. at viii. Borchard selected cases that exempli-
fied different types of error, which caused the erroneous convictions. Id. In most
cases, the erroneous conviction was secured because of one of the following types of
error: mistaken identification; circumstantial evidence (from which erroneous infer-
ences were drawn); and perjury. Id. This Comment focuses only on those convic-
tions that were obtained as a result of mistaken identification.
17Id. at xiii.
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error was responsible for twenty-nine of the sixty-five erroneous
convictions examined in the book.'8 Borchard opined:
These cases illustrate the fact that the emotional balance of the victim or
eyewitness is so disturbed by his extraordinary experience that his pow-
ers of perception become distorted and his identification is frequently
most untrustworthy. Into the identification enter other motives, not
necessarily stimulated originally by the accused personally-the desire to
requite a crime, to exact vengeance upon the person believed guilty, to
find a scapegoat, to support, consciously or unconsciously, an identifica-
tion already made by another .... How valueless are these identifica-
tions by the victim of a crime is indicated by the fact that in eight of
these cases the wrongfully accused person and the really guilty criminal
bore not the slightest resemblance to each other, whereas in twelve
other cases, the resemblance, while fair, was still not at all close.'
9
Even as long ago as 1932, Borchard recognized the different
dangers inherent in eyewitness testimony, including the general
distortion of a witness's perception and the possibility that a
witness's identification would be encouraged by maleficent mo-
tives.
Psychologists and scholars have long tried to explain the
phenomenon of inaccurate eyewitness testimony)l Some psy-
chologists take a scientific approach and claim that what is seen
by a witness goes through an entire process before it is fully
comprehended and retained. More specifically, they say that
what happens in front of one's eyes is transformed inside the
head, and is then refined, revisited, restored and embellished.22
Elizabeth Loftus, a leading researcher in the field, believes that
many erroneous identifications are caused by what is known as
"unconscious transference," the phenomenon in which a per-
son seen in one situation is confused with or recalled as a per-
son seen in a second situation.2
" Id. Some of these wrongful convictions were based on single eyewiness testi-
mony while others were based on the testimony of as many as seventeen eyewitnesses.
Id. atxxv n.1.
"Id. at xiii.
See e.g., research conducted by Elizabeth Loftus and Gary Wells, infra note 23.
21 SCHECKETAL, supra note 1, at 43.
2 id.
Id. at 44; see also ELIZMABETH Lonrus, EYEWITNESS TESI.MoNY 142 (1979). Loftus
further explains this phenomenon through her "paradigm for changes in (one's]
recollection." GARY WELLS & ELIZABETH LoFrus, EYErmrNEss TESnfo 
.
PSYcHOLOGICAL PEPEcrIvES 127 (1984). Loftus' paradigm describes three essential
stages that a person's memory goes through after witnessing an event:
2001]
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Extensive research has been conducted, analyzing the corre-
lation between the strength of a witness's confidence in his
identification and the accuracy of that identification.24 The
studies revealed that witnesses who were highly confident in
their identifications were more likely to be correct as compared
to witnesses who displayed little confidence25 The following
case, however, demonstrates an exception to this finding.
In 1984, Jennifer Thompson, a high-achieving college stu-
dent, was raped . During the rape, Thompson carefully studied
the face of her assailant so that she might be able to identify
him later.27 Without doubt, she identified RonaldJunior Cotton
as the man who had raped her. Cotton served eleven years in
prison before DNA testing exonerated him and revealed that a
man named Bobby Poole had actually committed the assault.
t2
Thompson was naturally shocked, and has since been very active
in speaking about the dangers of eyewitness testimony."
Thompson was face to face with her attacker, did nothing but
study his face during their entire encounter, and still made an
1. Acquisitiorn A witness views an initial complex event, which might also include viewing
one or more faces.
2. Retention and change A witness encounters new information subsequent to the initial
event. The source of new information might include biasing suggestions, viewing
photographs, a combination of pictures and messages, or even rehearsal of the origi-
nal event. Whatever the source, postevent experiences make possible changes in rec-
ollections. New information can be added, old information altered, or perhaps even
erased.
3. Retrieval A test of memory for the original event reveals that postevent experiences
have produced substantial changes in recollection. Indeed, the witness reacts as if
original memory and postevent information have been inextricably integrated.
Id. (italics added).
Wells et al., supra note 6, at 622.
Id. In his videotape, however, Wells stresses that "more likely" does not mean
"always." Wrongful Convictions: Causes and Remedies, supra note 9. Wells describes
the concept of "false certainty," whereby an eyewitness is highly certain of his identifi-
cation and it in fact is mistaken. Id. In instances of false certainty, Wells explains that
innocent people are convicted because the eyewitness is both mistaken and highly cer-
tain in his or her testimony. Id. The case ofJennifer Thompson, discussed next, is an
example of false certainty.
6 John Carman, Memory Doesn't ServeJustice, S.F. CHRON., February 25, 1997, at El;
Tom Humphries, Fight to theDeath (Part 2), THE IRISssTIMEsJuly 8, 2000, at 62.
27 id.
28 Id, see also State v. Cotton, 351 S.E.2d 277 (N.C. 1987). Note that this was not a
capital case. It is being discussed nevertheless because it is a good example of the fal-
libility of eyewitness testimony.2 9Fight to the Death (Part 2), supra note 26, at 62.
3 Id.
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incorrect identification. What follows are cases where the eye-
witnesses made observations from a distance and were similarly
wrong in their subsequent identifications.
3
'
On July 25, 1984, police discovered the partially nude body
of nine-year-old Dawn Hamilton in a wooded area in Balti-
more. 2 On March 22, 1985, twenty-four year old Kirk Blood-
sworth was sentenced to death for the rape and first-degree
murder of Dawn.3 Five eyewitnesses identified Bloodsworth as
the man who was last seen with Dawn. On the morning of the
murder, Dawn had come into the woods and had asked ten
year-old Christian Shipley and seven year-old Jackie Poling if
they could help her look for her cousin Lisa. Christian and
Jackie had refused to help, and said that a man agreed to assist
Dawn, and the two of them walked off together.! After Dawn's
body was found, Christian described the man's appearance to
the police and a composite sketch was drawn.5 Christian then
picked Bloodsworth from a photo spread and identified him as
the man who walked off with Dawn. 7 Jackie also identified
Bloodsworth from a line-up.s Donna Ferguson testified that she
saw Bloodsworth talking to Dawn near the woods on the day of
the murder."9 She too identified him at a line-up." James Keller
testified that as he was driving near the murder scene on the
morning of the murder, he saw a man standing on the side of
S Three out of the four cases that follow are rape and murder cases. Cases where
rape was committed were not specifically sought out for the purposes of this Com-
ment. They are included in this Article only because there was a substantial amount
of information available concerning the crimes, the convictions, and the subsequent
reversals.
32 SeeBloodsworth v. State, 543 A.2d 382, 384 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
' SCHECKETAL., supra note 1, at 218.
Bloodswort,, 543 A.2d at 384-85.
Id. at 385.
3 1&
Id. Christian's identification was questionable because he initially described the
man as having had blond hair, and Bloodsworth was a redhead. SCHECK ET AL supra
note 1, at 217.
Bloodsworth, 543 A.2d at 385. Jackie's identification was quite problematic.
When he first attended the line-up, he identified a man who was in the third position,
not Bloodsworth, who was in the sixth position. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1. at 216.
Jackie later told his mom and police that in reality, he had meant to pick out Blood-
sworth, but had been afraid. Id. The police took down Jackie's statement and re-
corded it as his new identification. Id




the road and he also identified Bloodsworth from both a photo
spread and the line-up.
With the exception of Christian and Jackie (and even their
identifications were questionable), none of the other eyewit-
nesses saw the man with Dawn from a close distance. And yet,
they were all able to identify confidently Bloodsworth as the
murderer. In 1994, it was discovered that Dawn's underwear
had been stained with semen, and after DNA testing was con-
ducted, Kirk Bloodsworth was released from prison, given a
pardon by the governor, and awarded $300,000 in special com-
pensation by the state. Because of erroneous eyewitness testi-
mony, Bloodsworth had spent nine years in jail.43
In another case, in 1978, a twenty-three year old woman was
gang-raped and both she and her fianc~e were murdered in
Ford Heights, Illinois. 4 Four men named Dennis Williams,
Kenny Adams, Verneal Jimerson, and Willie Rainge were con-
victed for the crimes." Jimerson and Williams were sentenced
to death. 6 The men were convicted based on the testimony of
Charles McCraney and Paula Gray. McCraney lived near the
crime scene and claimed that he saw the four defendants in the
vicinity around the time of the murders.4" McCraney testified
that on the day of the murders, he looked through his back
41Id.
42 SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at 220.
" Note that in this case there were five eyewitnesses, each of whom testified to a
different event. As this Comment later discusses, the two-witness rule would have re-
quired the testimony of two witnesses for each overt act. In other words, a total of ten
eyewitnesses would have been required. Rather than strictly follow the two-witness
rule, however, this Article is suggesting that some form of corroboration should have
been presented along with each witness's testimony. The corroboration would not
have had to come from another witness. See supra note 8; see also discussion concern-
ing overt acts infra pp. 779-82.
"People v. Williams, 588 N.E.2d 983, 989 (Ill. 1991). This case is more commonly
known as the Ford Heights Four case.
" Id. at 990.
46 Id
4 Gray, Kenny Adams's girlfriend, testified before the Grand Jury and implicated
the four defendants in the crimes. Id. at 989. She testified that she was with the de-
fendants during the rape and the murders, and that she had witnessed both victims
being shot in the head twice by the defendants. Id. Gray later recanted her entire
testimony, admitted that she in fact was not present during the commission of the
crimes, and that the police had coerced her into falsely implicating her friends. Ed-
ward Helmore, Death Row Innocents Freed by Students, TIE OBSERVER NEws, July 7, 1996,
at 21.
'a Williams, 588 N.E.2d at 990.
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bedroom window, which is located on the second floor of his
two-story apartment.4 9 McCraney claimed that from this vantage
point, he could see the defendants below inside their cars. 9
While he could identify the defendants after having observed
them from such a distance, he stated that he could not tell
whether the group included any white persons or women."
Nevertheless, his testimony was enough to enable the prosecu-
tors to obtain their convictions. Years later, in February of 1996,
the rape victim's body was exhumed for DNA testing. The test-
ing revealed that the semen found inside her could not have
come from any of the four defendants.53 The testing led to the
real perpetrators who subsequently confessed to the crimes.'
The four o riinal defendants were finally exonerated and freed
inJuly 1996.
In 1974, Delbert Tibbs was convicted of rape and first-
degree murder and was sentenced to death. ' The principal tes-
timonial evidence against Tibbs came from the rape victim,
Cynthia Nadeau.57 The rape had taken place in Ft. Myers, Flor-
ida, and except for Nadeau's testimony, there was no other evi-
dence placing Tibbs in the Ft. Myers area at the time.4 After
the rape and murder, Nadeau gave police a detailed description
of her assailant.59 Because he fit the description, Tibbs was
stopped several times for questioning.6 Nadeau was subse-
quently shown two photographs of Tibbs, whom she identified
as her attacker.6' She then identified him in a four-man lineup,
and again at trial.62 In 1976, the Florida Supreme Court recog-
nized the insufficiency and the potential dangers of eyewitness
testimony. The court reversed Tibbs's conviction and re-
4 Id.
5Id. at 991.
- Helmore, supra note 47, at 21.
"sId.
"Eric Zorn, Ford Heights 4 Case Also Callsfor Special Prosecutor, CHI. TPJm., December
12, 1996, at 1.
' Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fla. 1976).




612 Id. Because Nadeau had been shown photographs of Tibbs prior to the line-up,
Tibbs maintained that the line-up identification was tainted.
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manded the case for a new trial because of insufficient evi-
dence.6' The court opined, "Rather than risk the very real pos-
sibility that Tibbs had nothing to do with these crimes, we
reverse."6
In another case, Larry Hicks, a nineteen year-old African-
American man from Gary, Indiana, was convicted for the Feb-
ruary 1978 murders of Norton Miller and Stephen Cosby."'
Hicks and the victims had attended a party at the apartment of
two women who lived near Hicks.6 At Hicks's trial, the state's
evidence consisted mostly of the testimony of these two women,
who said they had seen Hicks arguing with the victims and wav-
ing a knife. The victims were found stabbed to death in an al-
ley outside the apartment building There was no physical
evidence linking Hicks to the crime.
A jury convicted Hicks of the murders, and the Judge sen-
tenced him to death. 0 Hicks subse uently filed a motion asking
for a new trial, and it was granted. Hicks's new lawyers inter-
viewed the two women who had testified against Hicks and both
recanted their testimony and admitted they had not seen Hicks
63 In so ruling, the court, citing an earlier Florida Supreme Court decision where
the only evidence identifying the defendant as a robbery participant was the sole tes-
timony of an eyewitness, said:
While the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses is ordinarily a matter
which is exclusively within the province of the jury to decide, and this court will as a rule
not reverse ajudgment based upon a verdict returned by the jury and approved by the trial
judge, when there is substantial evidence to support the verdict rendered, it is also the rule
that the evidence relied on to have this effect must be substantial in character.
When such evidence is not substantial in character, this court is committed to the rule that
a conviction will be reversed and a new trial ordered, where the evidence relied on is not
satisfactory to establish the identity of an accused as a participant in a crime of which he
has been found guilty.
Id. at 791 (quoting McNeil v. State, 139 So. 791, 792 (Fla. 1932)).64 Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 791 (Fla. 1976).




71 Ra Hicks's new lawyers alleged that his initial trial lawyer had been ineffective in
representing him and that Hicks himself had not been competent to stand trial.
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with a knife.d One woman said she had lied during the first
trial because she was afraid of the real killer, whom she then
identified.7 During the new trial, the two women gave substan-
tially different testimony and revealed the name of the man they
said was the real killer.4 The jury deliberated for six hours and
returned with a verdict of not guilty.n
These cases are just a few examples where innocent peo-
ple's lives may have been taken because of extremely fallible
evidence. Because of the highly inaccurate nature of eyewitness
testimony, a corroboration requirement must be instated when-
ever such testimony is offered as evidence in a capital case.
Currently, the United States federal statutes for capital crimes
include no evidentiary requirements. In her speech to the Bal-
timore County jury in Kirk Bloodsworth's trial, defense lawyer
Leslie Stein said:
Just because the state seeks the death penalty doesn't mean that their
evidence is strong. In fact, it is no comment on their evidence at all. It
is merely a comment on the kind of crime that was committed .... I
want to remind you of one other thing: that awful facts, ghastly evidence,
is not a substitute for proof.
76
II. CAPrrAL CRImES IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, there are three federal crimes for
which a death sentence may be imposed-espionage, murder,




76 S HECKETAL-, supra note 1, at 213.
7' The federal statute criminalizing espionage states that whoever gathers or deliv-
ers defense information to aid foreign government
shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, except
that the sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury or, if there is no jury. the
court, further finds that the offense resulted in the identification by a foreign power... of
an individual acting as an agent of the United States and consequently in the death of that
individual ....
18 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
The federal murder statute reads:
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder
perpetrated by poison ... or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlavfuflly and mali-
ciously to effect the death of any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in
the first-degree. whoever is guilty of murder in the first-degree shall be punished by death
or by imprisonment for life.
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tence for the commission of the crime may be death. The stat-
utes do not list or state any evidentiary requirements that need
to be met before a death sentence can be imposed 8  Perhaps
this deficiency is due to the fact that there is a separate federal
statute governing the imposition of the death sentence." How-
ever, this statute also fails in establishing specific evidentiary re-
quirements that must be met before a defendant may be
sentenced to death. 0 The only guidelines the United States
Code offers concerning the imposition of a capital sentence are
a list of mitigating and aggravating factors to be considered in
determining whether a sentence of death is justified."' These
mitigating and aggravating factors have nothing to do with the
quantity of evidence that must be offered by the prosecution in
order to secure an indictment in a capital case. Similarly, the
18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2000).
Finally, the federal treason statute states, "Whoever, owing allegiance to the
United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies.., is guilty of trea-
son and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined
under this title but not less than $10,000...." 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2000).
's While it is true that no criminal statutes list any evidentiary requirements for ei-
ther capital or noncapital offenses, this Comment is arguing that because of the irre-
versible nature of a sanction such as death, a specific evidentiary requirement should
be imposed for capital offenses.
"The "sentence of death" statute provides:
A defendant who has been found guilty of (1) an offense described in section 794 or sec-
tion 2381; or (2) any other offense for which a sentence of death is provided, if the defen-
dant, as determined beyond a reasonable doubt at the hearing under section 3593-
(a) intentionally killed the victim;
shall be sentenced to death if, after consideration of the factors set forth in section 3592
... it is determined that imposition of a sentence of death is justified ....
18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2000).
"' 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (2000) does require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but this
Article is suggesting that such a proof requirement is deficient and needs to more
explicitly delineate what exactly constitutes sufficient proof.
I See 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2000). The statute lists impaired capacity, duress, minor
participation, and no prior criminal record as some of the mitigating factors that may
be taken into consideration. There is a separate list of aggravating factors for the
crimes of espionage and treason, and the aggravating factors for homicide include
death during the commission of another crime, previous convictions, and a grave risk
of death to additional persons.
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Model Penal Code neglects to set any sort of quantitative re-
quirement for the type of evidence offered in a capital case.8
Because of the extreme fallibility of eyewitness testimony,
some type of standard governing this particular form of evi-
dence must be instated. The next section of this Article exam-
ines the United States law of treason, analyzes its corroboration
requirement, and explains how and why it should apply to other
capital offenses as well.
III. THE LAW OF TREASON
The law of treason is comprised of two elements: a two-
witness rule and an overt act requirement. Each element will
be examined separately, and finally, the elements' applicability
to other capital cases will be discussed.
A. THE TWO-WITNESS RULE
Treason is "the breach of the allegiance which a person
owes to the state under whose protection he lives, and the most
serious crime known to the law."" The Treason Clause of the
United States Constitution was written and adopted by men
whose ideas regarding the law of treason were derived from
English law."' The phraseology of Article III, Section 3 is largely
derived from the Statute of 25 Edward II-an English treason
statute that was enacted in 13506 The statute divided the alle-
2Similar to the federal statutes, the Model Penal Code states that a death sen-
tence may not be imposed where no aggravating factors were established by the evi-
dence or where substantial mitigating factors were established. MODEL PENAL CODE §
210.6 (1962). Concerning evidence, the Code states only:
In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the Court deems rele-
vant to sentence, including but not limited to the nature and circumstances of the cnme.
the defendant's character, background, history, mental and physical condition and any of
the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in Subsections (3) and (4) of this
Section. Any such evidence ... which the Court deems to have probative force, may be re-
ceived ... provided that the defendant's counsel is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut
such evidence.
Id. While the Code lists what may constitute evidence in a murder case, the Code
does not at all speak to the quantity of the evidence offered.
See supra note 10.
84 JULES ARCmER, TREASON iN A NmmcA 1 (1971) (quoting 27 ENc'LOPFEDiA
AwmcANA45 (1980)).
JsJAmfs WiLLAt HuRsr, T)HE LAW OFTREASON IN THE UNTImD STATES 15 (1945).
" I& Indeed, some of the phrases in Article M, Section 3 were lifted exactly from
the statute, which states that Treason exists:
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giance which every English subject owed his sovereign into two
categories, petit treason and high treason.87 Petit treason, which
later came to be considered murder, included the killing of a
master by his servant, a husband by his wife, and a prelate by a
man owing him faith and obedience.s High treason, which de-
noted crimes against the sovereign, listed the seven offenses that
constituted the crime, including planning or imagining the
death of the king, his wife, or their heir, or even raping the
king's wife or eldest daughter."
The two-witness requirement included in the Treason
Clause of the Constitution existed in some of the laws of the
colonies as early as the late seventeenth century and was based
on the Statute of 7 William 111.90 According to this statute, the
In case where a man doth compass or imagine the death of our Lord the King, the Lady
his Consort, or of their eldest son and heir, or if a man violate the King's Consort or the
King's eldest daughter being unmarried, or the consort of the King's eldest son and heir.
And ifa man evy waragainst our said Lord the King in his realm, or be adherent to the enenies
of our Lord the King in the realm, giving to thn aid and support in his realm or elsewhere;
and thereof be attainted upon due proof of open deed by people of their condition.




" See statute quoted supra note 86.
9' HuRST, supra note 85, at 81. The earliest act requiring two or more witnesses for
capital offenses seems to be Laws of New Haven Colony, which was enacted in 1656
and reads:
That no man shall be put to death, for any offense, or misdemeanour in any case, without
the testimony of two witnesses at least, or that which is Equivalent thereunto, provided, and
to prevent, or suppresse much inconvenience, which may grow, either to the publick, or to
particular Persons, by a mistake herein, it is Ordered, and declared, by the Authority afore-
said, that two, or three single witnesses, being of competent age, of sound understanding,
and of good Reputation, and witnessing to the case in question (whither it concerne the
publick peace, and welfare, or any one, and the same particular person) shall be ac-
counted (the party concerned having no just exception against them) sufficient proofe,
though they did not together see, or heare, and so witnesse to the same individuall, any
particular Act, in reference to those circumstances of time, and place.
Id. at 114-15.
The General Laws and Liberties of New Plimouth [sic] Colony, enacted in 1671,
provides:
That no Man be Sentenced to Death without Testimonies of two witnesses at least, or that
which is equivalent thereunto, and that two or three Witnesses, being of competent Age,
Understanding and of good Reputation, Testifying to the case in question, shall be ac-
counted and accepted as full Testimony in any case, though they did not together see or
hear, and so Witness to the same individual Act, in reference to circumstances of time and
place; Provided the Bench and Jury be satisfied with such Testimony.
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witnesses must testify to the same treasonable offense, and one
witness to each of two separate, or different, types of treason
would not suffice.9'
During the American Revolution, new legislation on treason
was enacted, but it still maintained agreat similarity to the stat-
utes of Edward Im and of William III. During this time period,
almost all the basic treason acts required the same thing: the
testimony of two lawful and credible witnesses.93 When America
gained its independence in 1776, retaining the two-witness re-
quirement remained a concern of the founding fathers and
delegates involved in the drafting of the Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution ultimately decided to very
restrictively define treason in the United States. 4 History had
shown them that men in power might falsely or loosely charge
Id. at 115.
In NewJersey, the Act of May 30, 1668 stated that:
Concerning taking away of a Man's life, It is Enacted ... that no Man's Life shall be taken
away under any Pretence but by Virtue of some Law established in this Province, that it be
proved by this Mouth of two or three sufficient Witnesses.
Id
91 Id at 82; see also L.M. Hill, The Two-itiness Rule in English Treason Trials: Some
Comments on the Emergence of.Procedural Law, 12 Am.J. LEGAL HIST. 95, 95 (1968).
2HURST, supra note 85, at 83. The Continental Congress, on June 24, 1776,
adopted the following.
Resolved, That all persons abiding vithin any of the United Colonies, and deriving protec-
tion from the laws of the same, owe allegiance to the said laws, and are members of such
colony; and that all persons passing through, visiting, or make [sic] a temporary stay in any
of the said colonies, being entitled to the protection of the la%s during the time of such
passage... owe, during the same time, allegiance thereto:
That all persons, members of, or owing allegiance to any of the United Colonies....
who shall levy war against any of the said colonies within the same, or be adherent to the
king of Great Britain, or others the enemies of the said colonies, or any of them, within the
same, giving to him or them aid and comfort, are guilty of treason against such colony
That it be recommended to the legislatures of the several United Colonies, to pass laws
for punishing ... such persons before described, as shall be proveably attaintcd of open
deed, by people of their condition, of any of the treasons before described.
Id. at 83-84. Mosaic law may also have influenced the new legislation: "One witness
shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that he sin-
neth: at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall the mat-
ter be established." Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 24 n.37 (1944) (quoting
Deuteronomy 19:15); see also Deuteronomy 17:6 (stating, "At the mouth of two witnesses,
or three witnesses, shall he that is worthy of death be put to death; but at the mouth
of one witness he shall not be put to death").
"Husr, supra note 85, at 106.
MTHE NEWENYCLOPFDIABRrrANNiCA906 (15th ed. 1998).
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their opponents with treason, and therefore, they denied Con-
gress the authority to enlarge or reshape the offense. 5
In Number 43 of The Federalist, James Madison wrote:
As treason may be committed against the United States, the authority of
the United States ought to be enabled to punish it. But as new-fangled
and artificial treasons have been the great engines by which violent fac-
tions, the natural offspring of free government, have usually wreaked
their alternate malignity on each other, the convention have, with great
judgment, opposed a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a con-
stitutional definition of the crime, fixing the proof necessary for convic-
tion of it, and restraining the Congress, even in punishing it, from
extending the consequences of guilt beyond the person of its author.
96
Indeed, Madison described the convention's goal of ensuring
the existence of a safeguard in the law of treason against the
"peculiar danger" of corruptly motivated accusations directed
towards those who were really innocent.
Interestingly, while all of the major books and articles writ-
ten about treason mention the framers' desire to keep the two-
witness requirement in the Constitution, none of them discusses
the exact reason for this desire.97 One could argue that if the
framers' main goal in keeping such a requirement was to pro-
tect innocents from perjuring witnesses, the framers' goal might
not be entirely successful because there would be no guarantee
that the corroborating witness would not commit perjury. If
one witness is willing to provide perjured testimony, nothing
prevents another witness from doing the same.9s
" Id; see also Cramer, 325 U.S. at 15. In Cramer, Justice Jackson opined:
The Convention numbered among its members men familiar with government in the Old
World, and they looked back upon a long history of use and abuse of the treason charge
.... But the basic law of treason in this country was framed by men who, as we have seen,
were taught by experience and by history to fear abuse of the treason charge almost as
much as they feared treason itself.
Id. at 15, 21.
Note, however, that during the beginning of the Constitutional Convention in
1787, Charles Pinckney proposed that only Congress should have the exclusive power
to declare what should be treason and misprision of treason against the United
States. Id. at 22.
'J.S. MnLL, AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: THEFEDERAuSr 140 (1989).
'7 See, e.g., ARCHER, supra note 84; CHAIN, infra note 101; HURST, supra note 85;
Hill, supra note 91.
' Surprisingly, none of the literature on treason addresses how a two-witness rule
would preclude both witnesses from committing perjury. See generally treason sources
cited supra note 97.
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Fortunately, more information concerning the framers' in-
tent is available with regard to the next element-the overt act
requirement.
B. THE OVERT ACT REQUIREMENT
In treason trials, the offering of two witnesses is not in itself
enough to obtain a conviction. The two witnesses must each
testify to the same overt act.99 Indeed, in the Federal Convention
debates of 1787, the delegates discussed the wording of Article
III, Section 3 and moved to insert the words "to the same overt
act" after "two witnesses."'0 0 According to the transcripts, Ben-
jamin Franklin (a delegate from Pennsylvania) wvanted this
amendment to take place because "prosecutions for treason
were generally virulent; and perjury too easily [was] made use of
against innocence. " 'O'
In Cramer v. United States, where the first conviction for trea-
son was reviewed by the Supreme Court, Justice Jackson ex-
plained what dangers concerned the framers when they drafted
the Treason Clause of the Constitution." 2 Jackson wrote:
Historical materials aid interpretation chiefly in that they show two kinds
of dangers against which the framers were concerned to guard the trea-
son offense: (1) perversion by established authority to repress peaceful
political opposition; and (2) conviction of the innocent as a result of peijuy,
passion, or inadequate evidence. The first danger could be diminished by
closely circumscribing the kind of conduct which should be treason ....
See supra note 10.
"o JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 wmcti
FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF A.mICA 433 (Gaillard Hunt &
James Brown Scott eds., 1987). During the session of Monday, August 20, 1787,John
Dickenson, a delegate from Delaware, apparently:
wished to know what was meant by the 'testimony of two witnesses,' vwhether they were to
be wimesses to the same overt act or to different overt acts. He thought also that proof of
an overt act ought to be expressed as essential to the case.
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 23 (1944).
Dr. Wim. Sam. Johnson, a delegate from Connecticut, also "considered ... that
something should be inserted in the definition concerning overt acts." Id.
"' Id. James Wilson of Pennsylvania responded to Dr. Franklin's concern and
noted, "much may be said on both sides. Treason may sometimes be practised in
such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult-as in a traitorous correspon-
dence with an Enemy." Id. Nevertheless, the proposal to add the words "to the same
overt act" was approved eight to three. I4 see also BRADLEY CHAPIN, THE AMEPRICAN
LAW OF TREASON 83 (1964); James Willard Hurst, Treason in the United States, 58 HAM.
L. REV. 395, 403 (1945).
2 HuRSr, supra note 85, at vii; see also Cramer, 325 U.S. at 27.
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The second danger lay in the manner of trial and was one which would
be diminished mainly by procedural requirements .... 103
The procedural requirement to which Jackson was referring was
the one mandating that each witness testify to the same overt
act. The reason for the requirement of an overt act had to do
with the unique nature of the crime of treason. The members
of the Federal Convention were familiar with and took into ac-
count the long history of use and abuse of the treason charge by
the government and they wanted to ensure that people would
not be tried for their thoughts or private opinions, but only for
actual acts that demonstrated such opinions.0 4
In Cramer, the Court noted that the framers of the Constitu-
tion were greatly influenced by eighteenth century French and
English liberal thought.'0 5 Benjamin Franklin in particular was
influenced by French philosophy, specifically the philosophy of
Montesquieu.' °6 In his well-known multi-volume work L'Esprit
des Lois, Montesquieu devoted an entire book to his philosophi-
cal reactions to the abuses of treason.0 7 He wrote:
Nothing renders the crime of high treason more arbitrary than declar-
ing people guilty of it for indiscreet speeches .... Words do not consti-
tute an overt act; they remain only in idea .... Overt acts do not
happen every day; they are exposed to the eye of the public; and a false
charge with regard to matters of fact may be easily detected. Words car-
ried into action assume the nature of that action. Thus a man who goes
into a public market-place to incite the subject to revolt, incurs the guilt
of high treason, because the words are joined to the action, and partake
of its nature. It is not the words that are punished but an action in
which the words are employed. 0
Montesquieu expressed well the framers' interests in not pun-
ishing someone for their mere thoughts or "indiscreet
speeches." The framers wanted to make sure that one would
only be tried for treason if one's words were 'joined" to some
sort of action.
'03 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 27-28 (emphasis added).
'" Id at 15.
10 Id at 15 n.21.
106 id
107 id
" Id. at 16 n.21. The main purpose of the overt act requirement is to prevent
prosecutions of mere "word crimes." The possibility of such prosecutions is inherent
in the nature of the crime of treason. While no such problem seems inherent to the
crime of murder, applying the overt act requirement to homicide cases would still be
useful, as is demonstrated infra pp. 783-86.
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In constructing Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution, the
framers combined known precedent from English law, French
philosophy, and even religion, and finally agreed upon the re-
quirement of two witnesses to the same overt act. ' 9 Much like
Montesquieu, the framers wanted to ensure that a person would
not be tried for treason unless he or she committed an act that
breached his or her allegiance to the United States."0 What the
framers did not clarify, and thereby left the Courts to have to
decide, was what exactly constituted an overt act."'
In three different decisions, the Supreme Court ultimately
defined an overt act as that which manifested a criminal inten-
tion and tended toward the commission of the crime of trea-
son."2 The Court further stated that while two witnesses had to
'09 Id at 24. See supra note 92 for the discussion of the religious influence upon
early treason legislation.
In his treatise on Evidence, Wigmore sets out the details of the two-uitness rule for
treason and writes:
The rule of two witnesses means ... that they must be effective witnesses, i.e., they must
both be beieved by the juy. A rule requiring a certain quantity of evidence is binding upon
the jurors as well as upon the judge; they are not to convict unless in their judgment the
required amount exists. If the testimony of one is rejected by the jury upon consideration,
there remains but one witness, less than the rule requires ....
Each of the witnesses must testify to the uiwle of the overt act; or, if it is separable, there
must be two witnesses to each part of the overt act.
7 WIiORE, EVIDENCE § 2038 (1978). See also 87 CJ.S. Treason § 15 (1954):
Until this overt act of treason has been proved by two competent witnesses... all other tes-
timony is irrelevant. The purpose of this constitutional requirement is to minimize the
danger of convicting the innocent, and therefore the provision must be applied in the
light of such purpose .... It is in effect a command that the overt acts must be established
by direct evidence which must be that of two witnesses instead of one.
Deducing what constitutes an overt act is discussed infra note 112.
10 Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 645 (1946) (stating that "The requirement
of an overt act is to make certain a treasonable project has moved from the realm of
thought into the realm of action").
. In CramerJusticeJackson writes:
Our problem begins where the Constitution ends. That instrument omits to specify what
relation the indispensable overt act must sustain to the two elements of the offense as de-
fined .... It requires that two witnesses testify to the same overt act, and dearly enough
the act must show something toward treason, but what?
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 30 (1944).
"' In United States v. Robinson,Judge Learned Hand wrote:
Nevertheless a question may indeed be raised whether the prosecution may lay as an overt
act a step taken in execution of the traitorous design, innocent in itself, and getting its
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testify to the same act, each witness's testimony did not have to
be identical. 113 Finally, the Court said that the witnesses did not
have to prove the defendant's intent because intent could be in-
ferred from the circumstances surrounding the overt act.1
4
The framers decided to keep the overt act requirement in
the Constitution because they wanted to ensure that people
would not be prosecuted for their thoughts."5 While the poten-
tial threat of being prosecuted solely for one's thoughts does
not really exist where the crime of homicide is concerned, im-
posing the two-witness rule and the overt act requirement would
still prove useful in decreasing the dangers inherent to eyewit-
ness testimony in general. The application of the two-witness
rule to homicide cases is discussed in this next section."6
treasonable character only from some covert and undeclared intent .... Lord Reading in
his charge in Casement's Case uses language which accords with my understanding: "Overt
acts are such acts as manifest a criminal intention and tend towards the accomplishment of
the criminal object. They are acts by which the purpose is manifested and the means by
which it is intended to be fulfilled."
Id. at 6-7 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 259 F. 685, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1919)).
In Haupt v. United States, Justice Jackson elaborated on what he thought was meant
by the overt act requirement:
The Constitution requires testimony to the alleged overt act .... And while two witnesses
must testify to the same act, it is not required that their testimony be identical. Most overt
acts are not single, separable acts, but are combinations of acts or courses of conduct made
up of several elements ....
One witness might hear a report, see a smoking gun in the hand of defendant and see
the victim fall. Another might be deaf, but see the defendant raise and point the gun, and
see a puff of smoke from it. The testimony of both would certainly be "to the same overt
act," although to different aspects. And each would be to the overt act of shooting, al-
though neither saw the movement of a bullet from the gun to the victim. It would still be a
remote possibility that the gun contained only a blank cartridge and the victim fell of heart
failure. But it is not required that testimony be so minute as to exclude every fantastic hy-
pothesis that can be suggested.
Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 640 (1946).
Justice Douglas, in his concurrence, further opined:
As the Cramer case makes plain, the overt act and the intent with which it is done are sepa-
rate and distinct elements of the crime. Intent need not be proved by two witnesses but
may be inferred from all the circumstances surrounding the overt act.
Id. at 645.
" See Justice Jackson's opinion supra note 112.
SeeJustice Douglas' concurrence supra note 112.
" See supra note 104.
The phrase "two-witness rule" includes the overt act requirement.
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C. THE APPLICATION OF THE TWO-WITNESS RULE TO OTHER
CAPITAL CASES
As discussed earlier, Kirk Bloodsworth was convicted based
on the testimony of five eyewitnesses.117  The two-witness rule
would have required that two witnesses testified to each overt act
that was witnessed. In other words, ten witnesses would have
had to have been produced in order for a conviction to have
been obtained. This Comment, however, is proposing that an-
other witness need not be the only form of acceptable corrobo-
ration. As long as some form of corroboration is offered in
conjunction with each witness's testimony, the conviction can be
secured 1 8 To corroborate a witness's testimony, the prosecutor
can offer DNA evidence, fingerprint or footprint evidence, or
even an audio or videotape of what the witness saw." 9 In the
117 See supra note 43.
' See supra note 8.
"9 Note that Connecticut has a statute that imposes a requirement similar to the
one being proposed in this Comment. With regard to testimony required in a capital
case, the Connecticut statute says, "No person shall be convicted of any crime punish-
able by death without the testimony of at least two witnesses, or that which is equiva-
lent thereto." CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 54-83 (1960); see also 7 WIG.fOR, EvIDENcE § 2044
(1978).
The Connecticut statute was first adopted in 1672, and was then worded as fol-
lows: "It is ordered by this court; That no person for any fact committed shall be put
to death without the testimony of two or three witnesses, or that which is equivalent
thereto." State v. Marx, 60 A. 690, 691 (Conn. 1905). According to the court, the
statute was based not on the law of treason, but on Mosaic code. Id.; see also supra
note 92 (citing Deuteronomy). Interestingly, just as the literature on treason fails to
explain how a two-witness rule would preclude both witnesses from committing per-
jury, the court in Marx fails to explain why Connecticut felt the need to adopt such a
statute. See generally Marx, 60 A. 690 (failing to discuss why Connecticut adopted the
statute); see also supra note 98. In a later case, the Connecticut Supreme Court only
says that the statute was designed "to prevent a person from being put to death by the
unsupported testimony of one witness." State v. Schutte, 117 A. 508, 510 (Conn.
1922). The court opined, "a single witness, however positive, and however credible,
will not warrant a conviction, where life is in question." Id.
Connecticut's statute is only somewhat similar to the corroboration requirement
being proposed in this Comment. In Schutte, the court explained that the statute did
not require two witnesses to testify to the same fact. Id. The two witnessesjust had to
testify to "material and relevant circumstances... tending to show the guilt of the ac-
cused." Id. In other words, the Connecticut statute is unlike treason's two-witness
rule and is unlike the corroboration requirement being suggested in this Article. The
statute does not require that the witnesses testify to the same overt act, or that other
forms of corroborating evidence be provided to support what the witness saw. Con-




case of Bloodsworth, one of the witnesses testified that she saw
Bloodsworth near the woods on the day of the murder.'2 0 This
Article is proposing that in order for her testimony to be admis-
sible at Bloodsworth's trial, the prosecution would also have to
offer either another eyewitness who can testify to the same sight,
or perhaps evidence of Bloodsworth's footprint near the
woods.
The D.C. Circuit has recognized that the reasoning behind
treason's two-witness rule is applicable to other types of crimes.
In 1952, the circuit applied the reasoning behind and justifica-
tion for the two-witness rule to a sex crime prosecution.2 2 The
issue before the court was whether ajudgment of conviction for
a sex offense could be sustained upon the testimony of one wit-
ness, without any corroboration.' The court noted that all
courts in general are unusually skeptical toward accusations
about sexual offenses.'24 The court stated that the reason for
skepticism was probably fear of the stigma that would attach to
an unjustly convicted defendantss The court elaborated:
Moreover, the courts have been realistic about the effects of a threat to
accuse one of sodomy .... So abominable is the crime, and so destruc-
tive is even the accusation of it, of all social right and privilege, that the
law considers that the accusation is a coercion which men cannot resist.
This seems to be the only case in which a threat to prosecute, will supply
the place of actual force ....
There is virtually no protection, except one's reputation and appearance
of credibility, against an uncorroborated charge of this sort. At the same
time, the results of the accusation itself are devastating to the accused
So . . .the law must be exceedingly careful in its processes. While en-
forcement of this particular statute must seek the prevention of the of-
' Bloodsworth v. State, 543 A.2d 382, 385 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
121 Of course, there is the chance that even if Bloodsworth's footprint can be found
near the woods, he may not have left it there at the time of the murder. But see Haupt
v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 640 (1946): "It would still be a remote possibility that
the gun contained only a blank cartridge and the victim fell of heart failure. But it is
not required that testimony be so minute as to exclude every fantastic hypothesis that
can be suggested."
122 Kelly v. United States, 194 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1952). Even though this is not a
capital case, for the purposes of this Comment, it is useful to see how the D.C. Circuit
applied the reasoning behind the two-witness rule to a non-treason case.
12' Id. at 152.




fense, it must also seek to prevent unwarranted irreparable destruction
to reputations ... 126
The court notes that while one of the statute's purposes is to de-
ter the commission of the crime altogether, if the crime is
committed, another purpose is to protect the irreparable ruin
of one's reputation caused by a false or unwarranted accusa-
tion.12
7
The D.C. Circuit continues by recognizing that the prob-
lems of quantitative requirements of proof in criminal cases are
not novel, and it is here that the court cites Wigmore'sjustifica-
tion for the two-witness rule in treason prosecutions. 1 The
court explains that by Wigmore's standards, a quantitative
measure of proof in such cases is clearly justified "because the
likelihood of false accusations is enormous and the harm done
by failure to convict is relatively very small."' '
While advancing support for a corroboration requirement
in this sex crime prosecution, the court does offer an effective
counter-argument to the requirement. The court states:
[T]here is a powerful consideration which operates against such abso-
lute requirements. Rigid quantitative requisites of proof would seriously
restrict prosecutions for this offense and to that extent impair enforce-
ment of the statute. Probably only rarely is this offense committed in the
presence of a third person, and only rarely is the verbal invitation [to
commit a lewd act] corroborated by some proven circumstance which
establishes that the invitation has actually been made.
'' ld. at 153-54.
Id. at 154.
IuId. The court quotes Wigmore who, in his treatise on Evidence, wrote:
The true solution seems to depend on the relative proportion, in experience, of two ele-
ments, namely, the likelihood of false accusations, as compared vith the harm of a guilty
person's escape. When the former (relatively to the specific crime) is large. and the latter
(relatively to the specific crime) is small, then the two-%itness rule may bejustified as being
often effective, and seldom harmful when not effective.
Id (quoting 7 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2037(1978)).
'2 Kelly v. United States, 194 F.2d 150, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
' Id. The court responds to this counter-argument by stating that its opinion in
this case is by no means setting forth rigid requirements that must be adhered to in
future sex offense prosecutions. Id. The court is rather setting forth "certain consid-
erations" that trial courts should take into consideration when next prosecuting a
similar case. Id. The three considerations are: (1) the testimony of a single witness to
a verbal invitation to sodomy should be considered with great caution; (2) evidence
of the defendant's good character, while not particularly impressive, should nonethe-
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The court correctly recognizes that the problem with any rigid
quantitative requirement, especially that of corroboration, is
that it may not be possible for such a requirement even to be
met.
This Article, however, is not proposing a rigid or absolute
rule. The corroboration requirement proposed in this Article is
not as rigid as and slightly deviates from the absolute two-witness
treason rule. This Comment suggests that if a prosecutor plans
on offering eyewitness testimony at trial in a capital case, the
prosecutor must also provide some form of corroboration to
that testimony. If no such corroboration is available, the prose-
cutor can get around the requirement by not presenting eye-
witness testimony at all or by presenting the uncorroborated
testimony and seeking life imprisonment rather than capital
punishment. The corroboration requirement would only be
triggered when the prosecution chose to use eyewitness testimony
as evidence in a capital case.
There are certain analogies that can be drawn with respect
to prosecutions for treason and homicide, and these analogies
further support applying treason's two-witness rule to the homi-
cide cases. These analogies are discussed in this next section.
IV. THEJUSTIFICATION FOR APPLYING THE Two-WITNESS RULE
TO ALL CAPITAL CASES
One could argue that the two-witness rule should not apply
to crimes such as murder because the opportunities for falsely-
made accusations in sodomy and treason cases are quite differ-
ent than those behind homicide cases. ' By their very nature,
sodomy and treason cases more readily lend themselves to false
accusations. One could accuse someone of committing either
sodomy or treason, and no explicit proof such as a dead body or
a murder weapon would be required to substantiate the accusa-
tion. Furthermore, the accuser in sodomy and treason cases is
generally a private individual. In murder cases, the state is usu-
ally the accuser, and without explicit evidence of either a dead
body or a murder weapon or blood, for instance, an accusation
alone cannot prove that the crime even occurred.
less be considered; and (3) corroboration of the circumstances surrounding the in-
volved parties should be required. Id. at 154-55.
" Sodomy is included here to recall the D.C. Circuit's adoption of the reasoning
behind the two-witness rule to a sex crime prosecution. See supra note 122.
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The differences between sodomy, treason and murder,
however, do not bar the application of the two-witness rule to
homicide cases because while the opportunities for false accusa-
tions differ among the crimes, the motives behind the unjust
accusations do not. With respect to treason, false accusations
were largely driven by political motivations-men with political
power were likely to accuse their opponents of treason for per-
sonal gain."' Similarly, with respect to homicide, false accusa-
tions are often encouraged due to political pressures. 'ss With
respect to truly heinous homicide cases, especially those com-
manding great public interest, police and prosecutors alike are
under tremendous pressures to secure convictions. ' m In many
instances, these pressures lead to perjured eyewitness testi-
135
mony.
1-2 THE Nxw ENCYCLOPEniA BrAN 
_ic 906 (15th ed. 1998).
See, e.g., SCHECKET AL., supra note 1, at 79; Helmore, supra note 47.
' In Oklahoma v. Robert Lee Mi/er, ninety-two year old Zelma Cutler was found dead
in her bed. Sc ECT AL., supra note 1, at 79. Zelma had been raped and suffocated
by the weight of her perpetrator. Id. Five months earlier, the same thing had hap-
pened to another elderly woman in the neighborhood. Id. The public, quite natu-
rally, was outraged, and the police and district attorney were under tremendous
public pressure to find the man who had committed these heinous crimes. Id. at 80.
One young woman had said, "My grandmother lived out there. I was among many
citizens wanting the police to get this case solved." Id
The police gave all of their suspects blood tests, and Robert Miller's blood was
among a few whose blood matched that of the perpetrator. Id. Miller went to the po-
lice station for questioning and told the police that he had had a dream about the
murders and could guess at how they had occurred. Id at 80-81. Based on this story.
the detectives decided they had found their man and District Attorney Robert Macy
immediately announced that he was moving quickly to file capital murder charges
against Miller. Id. at 81. Macy said, "I want to let the public know this man is in cus-
tody, and the danger has been removed." Id. In 1988, Miller was sentenced to two
death penalties, plus 725 years. Id. at 84. It was not until ten years later that Miller
was found innocent and released because advanced DNA testing proved that he
could not have raped the two victims. Id. at 101, 106.
" As discussed earlier in Part I of this Comment, one of the two witnesses in the
Ford Heights Four case ultimately recanted her testimony and stated that the police
had coerced her into falsely implicating her friends. Helmore, supra note 47, at 21.
Most recently, thirty-four-year-old Christopher Ochoa was released from prison
where he was serving a life sentence for the murder of twenty-year-old Nancy De-
Priest. 2 Cases Plead for Life, USA TODAY, Jan. 23, 2001, at 14A. DNA evidence proved
Ochoa's innocence. Id. Ochoa had been coerced into confessing to the murder by
investigators who tapped his arm where they said a lethal injection would take place if
he did not admit his guilt. Id. The investigators told Ochoa if he pled guilty, he
would get a life sentence instead. Id.
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Justice Brennan, in United States v. Wade, addressed the
prevalence of prosecutorial influence upon eyewitness identifi-
cation. He opined:
The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of
criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification. Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter once said: "What is the worth of identification testimony
even when uncontradicted? The identification of strangers is proverbi-
ally untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony are established by a
formidable number of instances in the records of English and American
trials .... " A major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscar-
riage ofjustice from mistaken identification has been the degree of sug-
gestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the
suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification. A commentator has observed
that "the influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably ac-
counts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single fact9r-perhaps it is
responsible for more such errors than all other factors combined.'
156
Justice Brennan's opinion in Wade very nicely articulates the
dangers that are inherent in eyewitness testimony.
In order to protect innocents from being unjustly accused
of treason because of improper political motivations, the fram-
ers decided to retain England's two-witness rule and include it
in our Constitution.'3 In order to protect innocents from being
unjustly accused of murder because of political pressures, the
Supreme Court should rule that if a prosecutor plans on pre-
senting eyewitness testimony as evidence in a capital case, unless
the prosecutor can also offer some corroboration for that testi-
mony, the testimony will be inadmissible at trial. Again, this rul-
ing would not prevent prosecutors from prosecuting a
defendant at all if there were no eyewitnesses-it would merely
require that if a prosecutor planned on using eyewitness testi-
mony, he would have to provide some form of corroboration for
the testimony because of the high likelihood of its fallibility.
One could argue that the motives behind committing the
crimes of treason and murder are too different, and that be-
cause the nature of the crimes differs, so too should the eviden-
tiary requirements for each offense. While the motives behind
the commission of treason and homicide are different, the re-
116 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1967) (emphasis added).
117 In his treatise, Wigmore wrote that the purpose of the two-witness rule is to "se-
cure the subject from being sacrificed to fictitious conspiracies, which have been the
engines of profligate and crafty politicians in all ages." 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2037
(1978) (quoting BLAcGSToNE, 3 COMMENTARiEs 358 (4th ed. 1770)).
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suiting injury to the falsely accused defendant is still very much
the same, and it is this result that the two-witness rule was de-
signed to prevent. As mentioned earlier, the D.C. Circuit was
able to recognize this goal of the two-witness rule when it ap-
plied the rule to a sex prosecution case.'38 The court wanted to
protect an unjustly accused defendant from the negative stigma
that would attach to him because of the nature of the offense
being charged 9 One could certainly say that the nature of the
crimes of treason and murder is such that a negative stigma
would probably attach to the person accused of committing ei-
ther crime. The two-witness rule was placed to prevent citizens
from unjustifiably being tried for treason. Similarly, a corrobo-
ration requirement should be instated to prevent people from
being unjustifiably tried for any capital offense.
CONCLUSION
Irrespective of one's motive, the fact is that false accusations
are made and perjured testimony is offered whatever the crime,
be it treason, sodomy, or murder, and the results of those accu-
sations are all equally damaging.'40 Even in cases where malefi-
cent motives are not at play, the reality is that innocent people
are being convicted for crimes they did not commit because of
an extremely fallible form of evidence-eyewitness identifica-
tion.'41 Mistaken identification is the largest single factor ac-
counting for wrongful convictions.'42
Completely eliminating the dangers of capital convictions
based on eyewitness testimony is an impossibility, but mitigating
such dangers is at least possible through the instatement of a
corroboration requirement in all capital cases. Allowing a de-
l'$ SeeKelly v. United States, 194 F.2d 150, 153-54 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
139 'd
' In his book, The Spirit of Laws, under the section entitled "Of Laws favorable to
the Liberty of the Subject in a Republic," Montesquieu points out the importance of
the two-witness rule because:
In popular governments it often happens that accusations are carried on in public, and
every man is allowed to accuse whomsoever he pleases. This rendered it necessary to estab-
lish proper laws, in order to protect the innocence of the subject.
BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SP=lrr OF LAWS 199 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1899).
Montesquieu in fact advocated applying the two-witness rule to all capital cases. Cra-
merv. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 24 (1944).
... See discussion supra note 4.
" SeeWrongful Convictions: Causes and Remedies, supra note 9.
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fendant to be sentenced to death where his conviction is largely
based on evidence that is historically proven to be so fallible
clearly violates the defendant's Eighth Amendment right to be
free of cruel and unusual punishment.43 In order to prevent
such a situation from occurring, the Supreme Court, when re-
viewing its next capital case where eyewitness testimony is of-
fered as evidence, should hold that unless the testimony is
corroborated in some way, the defendant's conviction, if based
solely on such testimony, must be overturned and declared a
violation of the defendant's Eighth Amendment rights.'"
,' See discussion supra note 7.
1" See supra note 7.
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